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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD GERALD DYE, aka
R. GERALD DYE, and GAS
PRODUCING ENTERPRISES, INC.,
a corporation,
Plaintiffs - Respondents,
' 1

-vs-

Case No. 15475

MILLER & VIELE, a corporation,
LEE CHARLES MILLER, LESLEY
F. LEWIS, and CHEVRON OIL
COMPANY, a corporation,
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Claiming Any Right, Title,
Estate, Lien or Interest in
the Real Property Described
in the Complaint Adverse to
Plaintiffs' Ownership, or any
Cloud upon Plaintiffs' Title
Thereto.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action to quiet title to an undivided onehalf mineral interest.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The district court granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment finding Plaintiff Dye to be the owner of the undivided
one-half mineral interest.

Defendant Miller & Viele's Motion

for Summary Judgment was denied.

The court held that Defendant

Miller & Viele was barred by the applicable statutes of limita-

tion for tax titles from interposing defenses to Plaintiff Dye':
tax title to the disputed one-half mineral interest.

The distri

court denied that portion of Plaintiffs' Motion pertaining to
perfection of Plaintiff Dye's title by adverse possession.
Judgment was entered quieting title to the disputed one-half
mineral interest

i~

Plaintiff Dye.

The court further ordered

Defendant Chevron Oil Company (now Chevron USA, Inc.) to disburs
to Plaintiffs accrued and future shares of oil and gas production attributable to the disputed one-half mineral interest.
There are no disputed issues of fact.

All relevant

facts pertaining to the chains of title and lack of possession
by Defendant Miller & Viele were either admitted in the
or stipulated and agreed to by the parties.

pleadin~

All facts pertainir

to possession by Plaintiffs or their predecessors and the
Payment of Taxes were submitted upon affidavit and certified
abstract.

Only issues of law were decided by the Court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Plaintiffs seek affirmance of the ruling below.
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IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES AND
EXPLANATION OF ABBREVIATIONS
Miller & Viele, a defendant and the appellant, hereinafter will be referred to as Miller & Viele.

Defendant

Chevron Oil Company hereinafter will be referred to as
Chevron or, where appropriate, by its full name.

Richard

Gerald Dye, a plaintiff and respondent, hereinafter will
be referred to as Dye or, where appropriate, by his full
name.

Plaintiff and respondent Gas Producing Enterprises,

Inc., hereinafter will be referred to by its complete
name.

Richard Gerald Dye and Gas Producing Enterprises,

Inc., collectively, hereinafter will be referred to as
plaintiffs or, where appropriate, by their names.
"R" refers to a page reference in the record of the
case.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts set forth in defendant's brief
(pp. 3-7) is accurate so far as it goes.

However, defendant

omits certain pertinent facts essential to a full and accurate
statement, and therefore plaintiffs present this additional
statement.
It is true that Richard Gerald Dye is a record owner of
the undivided one-half interest in minerals underlying the
forty acres legally described as the NW~NE~ of Section 29
in Township 1 South, Range l West, USM, located in Duchesne
County, Utah.
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Dye's title to the undivided one-half interest in minerals
underlying the forty acres in dispute sterns directly from the
Auditor's Tax Deed issued to Duchesne County on May 9, 1932
(R-231, 300).

On December 21, 1927, the

NW\NE~

(including all

minerals) had been sold to Duchesne County for delinquent gener
property taxes assessed and levied for tax year 1927 (R-230, 29
These lands were not redeemed from tax sale by the "legal owner
by any other person or party holding an interest therein during
statutory four year period for redemptions of lands f rorn tax sa
(R-230, 231).

The lands were then "struck-off"

County at the 1932 May Sale, at which time the Auditor's
issued (R-231).

The surface of the

NW~NE\

Due~

(sold) to

Tax~

and the undivided on

interest in minerals here in dispute was ultimately conveyed
to Dye in 1954 (R-232, 371).
Dye and his predecessors in interest have been in actual
possession and occupancy of the

NW\NE~

since 1954 and have

paid all real property taxes levied and assessed against
the property since 1936 (R-232,233).

The remaining undivided

one-half interest in minerals is owned by one of Dye's predecessors in interest and is not in dispute here (R-232, 345).
It is true that Miller & Viele claims an interest in
the disputed undivided one-half interest in minerals.

Miller &

Viele's claim sterns from a 1928 mortgage foreclosure and
execution sale in favor of defendant Lee Charles Miller of the
NW\NE~

which was already subject to the 1927 preliminary tax

sale to Duchesne County (R-230, 296).

Through a series of Conv
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i

v

the interest obtained by defendant Lee Charles Miller pursuant
to the foreclosure proceeding devolved upon Miller & Viele in
1930 (R-231, 298), still subject to the 1927 preliminary tax sale
to Duchesne County.
NW~NE~

In 1946 Miller & Viele quitclaimed the

to one of Dye's predecessor's in interest, purporting to

reserve to itself the undivided one-half interest in minerals
now in dispute (R-233, 337).
At the time Miller & Viele received its deed to the NW\NE\,
it was, and now still is a Utah Corporation engaged in the
business of real estate investment and mortgage banking (R-230).
Neither Miller & Viele, nor any of its predecessors in interest
redeemed the NW\NE\ from tax sale during the statutory four year
period for redemption (R-231) .

At no time during the forty-seven

years since receiving its deed from its predecessor did Miller &
Viele go into actual possession or actual occupancy of the
NW~NE~

(R-233).

At no time during the forty-seven years

since receiving its deed from its predecessor did Miller & Viele
pay the general property taxes levied and assessed against the
NW~NE\

(R-233).

In sununary, the facts of this case developed two independant
record chains of title; one in plaintiff Dye stemming from the
tax sale proceedings, the other in defendant Miller & Viele
through the mortgage foreclosure proceeding.

These chains of

title are illustrated for convenience on page 1 of the Appendix
to this brief.

The ultimate question presented is whether Miller

& Viele is barred by the applicable statutes of limitation from

asserting its chain of title.
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Plaintiffs take no exception to Miller & Viele's Statement
of Facts pertaining to creation of the oil and gas leasehold
estates, the Cornrnunitization Agreement, formation of the 640
acre drilling and spacing unit, and completion and operation
of the R. G. Dye l-29Al Well in the

SW~NW~SE~

of Section 29.

Plaintiffs do add, however, that defendant Chevron Oil Company
did not physically enter upon the

NW~NE~

during its exploration

drilling and production operation (R-156 to 183) .

ARGUMENT

Point I
DEFENDANT MILLER & VIELE IS BARRED BY THE STATUTES OF LIMITATIG
FOR TAX TITLES FROM INTERPOSING ANY DEFENSE TO PLAINTIFF RICHAR
GERALD DYE'S TAX TITLE TO THE NW~NE~ INCLUDING THE UNDIVIDED ON
HALF MINERAL INTEREST IN SAID LANDS ON GROUNDS THAT SAID DEFENS
IS INTERPOSED MORE THAN FOUR YEARS SUBSEQUENT TO ISSUANCE OF Tli
TAX TITLE AND DEFENDANT MILLER & VIELE OR ITS AGENTS HAVE NOT
ACTUALLY OCCUPIED OR BEEN IN ACTUAL POSSESSION OF THE LANDS WIT
FOUR YEARS PRIOR TO INTERPOSITION OF ITS DEFENSE PURSUANT TO UT
CODE ANN. §§78-12-5.l and -.2 (1953).
Although judicial decision appears to entitle Miller & Vie
to have the facts viewed in a light most favorable to it inasmuch as this is an appeal from a Summary Judgment, it must be
noted that all facts pertaining to the respective chains of tit
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were stipulated to by the parties to this appeal.

All facts

pertaining to actual possession of the NW\NE\ and to payment
of taxes by Dye and his predecessors in interest, as well as
to exploration and production activities of Chevron Oil
Company were submitted by both parties to the appeal upon
affidavit and certified abstract and are uncontroverted.
Both plaintiffs and defendant Miller & Viele moved the
lower court for summary judgment on grounds that there were
no material issues of fact.

With the sole exception of the

Driscoll affidavit pertaining to the perimeters of the
"common source of supply", which the lower court refused to
accept, all facts were before the court.

There was no new

or additional evidence which could have been presented to
the court even in a trial setting.

The district court

considered all the evidence and every inference fairly to be
derived therefrom, and ruled in plaintiffs' favor.

This

case was a particularly appropriate case for summary judgment
as there were no disputed facts.
district court were issues of law.

The only issues in the
They are now on appeal.

The issue for determination is whether or not Miller &
Viele is barred by the applicable statutes of limitation
from interposing its defenses to Dye's tax title.

This

issue in turn raises the real question to be determined
whether Miller & Viele was in actual possession of the
disputed mineral interest within four years prior to the
interposition of its defense in this lawsuit to Dye's
tax title.
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The district court's decision was based upon §§78-12-5.1 an
78-12-5.2, the statutes which prescribe the period of limitation
applicable in tax title litigation.

Miller & Viele's position a

appeal is that it fits the actual possession exception of those
statutes and therefore is not barred from asserting its defense
to Dye's title.
Specifically, Miller & Viele contends that it was in

posse~

of the undivided one-half mineral interest underlying the

NW\NE~

by and through its oil and gas lessee, Chevron Oil Company, with
the four year period prior to interposition of Miller & Viele's
defense to Dye's tax title.

The facts upon which Miller & Viele

seeks to support its contention are that Chevron is operator of
the R. G. Dye l-29Al Well which produces oil and gas from a comm
source of supply underlying the drilling unit into which the Dye
lease was pooled.

The well operated by Chevron is located in tb

SW\NW\SE\ of the Section 29 drilling unit on a lease other than
Dye lease.

Miller & Viele concludes that production of oil and

from the well-head somehow constitutes actual possession of the
undivided one-half mineral interest in the NW\NE\.
However, the cases relied upon by Miller & Viele to support
its position that possession of the lessee inures to the benefit
of the lessor are ancient landlord-tenant and mortgagee-mortgago
cases from foreign jurisdictions which are not controlling upon
this Court. Furthermore, those oil and gas cases cited by Miller
Viele in its brief do not stand for the proposition asserted by
Miller & Viele; that production of oil and gas from lands pooled
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into a drilling unit consitutes "actual" possession of the mineral
estates in those lands.

1:

In fact the law of those cases is to the

contrary, and is directly supportive of plaintiffs' position.
Plaintiffs contend, that based upon the statutes and
compelling oil and gas case law, Chevron was not in actual possession
or actual occupancy of the

NW~NE~,

including the underlying mineral

;: estate, required by the applicable statutes of limitation.

There-

.,

fore, Miller & Viele is barred from challenging Dye's tax title.

e

The Utah statutes of limitation for tax titles bar all
challenges to tax titles which are not brought within four

m of the date of issuance of the tax title.

years

Peterson v. Callister,

·e 6 Utah 2d 359, 313 P.2d 814 (1957); Hansen v. Morris, 3 Utah 2d 310,

:h1 283 P. 2d 884

(1955).

There are two exceptions to the barring of

untimely defenses, limited (1) to persons challenging the tax title
who have actually occupied or who have been in actual possession of
the lands affected by the tax title; and (2) to cities or towns who
hold a lien which is equal or superior to the claim of the tax

rt title holder.

it

Miller & Viele relies on the possession exception which

go reads in context as follows:
n

er

.ed

. no such action or defense shall be commenced or
interposed more than four years after the date of the
tax deed . . . unless the person commencing or interposing such action or defense . . . has actually
occupied or been in possession of such.propert~ ~ith
in fours prior to the commencement or interposition
of such action or defense . . . (emphasis added)
§78-12-5.1
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The companion proviso reads as follows:
. this section shall not bar any action or
defense by the owner of legal title to such property where he .
. has actually occupied or been
in actual possession of such property within four
years from the commencement or interposition of
such action or defense .
(emphasis added)
§78-12-5.2
Although this exception has been formerly recognized by the Utai

s:

Supreme Court in Huntington City v. Peterson, 30 Utah 2d 408,
P.2d 1246 (1974), the court has given no indication that the

"~

possession" exception in the statutes was anything other than
actual possession.
The Utah Supreme Court has defined "actual possession" of
real property interests as follows:
"Actual possession exists where the thing (real
property) is in the immediate occupancy of the
party;" B.L. Diet p. 349; or as the court in this
case instructed the jury, "Actual possession is
the subjugation of the premises to the use and
dominion of the claimant." [Lillianskyoldt v.
Goss, 2 Utah 297 (1877) ].
That case involved an action to recover an undivided interest
in real property.
The Utah position is in accord with other jurisdictions whc
have defined the term similarly when construing similar types of
statutes.

In People ex rel Turner v. Kelsey, 89 NYS 416, 418,

96 App. Div. 148 (1904), the New York Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, in construing a real property tax statute which requir
a party to be in "actual possession" prerequisite to redeeming
delinquent property from tax sale, said:
"'Actual possession,' is a legal phrase, is
put in opposition to the other phrase, 'possession
in law,' or 'constructive possession.'
Actual
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possession is the same as pedis possessio or pedis
positio, and these mean a foothold on the land, an
actual entry, a possession in fact, a standing upon
it, an occupation of it, as a real, demonstrative
act done.
It is the contrary of a possession in
law, which follows in the wake of title."
The Utah adverse possession statutes countained in §§78-12-9
and §78-12-11 are helpful in defining what types of acts constitute

3.i

s:

"actual possession" of land.

Under those statutes a person is

considered to have occupied or possessed lands where the person

le

(1) cultivates or improves the land; or (2) protects the land by
a substantial inclosure; or (3) uses the land for fuel, timber,
pasturage, or other ordinary use of the land; or (4) expends the
value of $5.00 per acre in labor or money to erect or maintain
irrigation works.

The acts expressly stated in those statutes

as constituting actual possession, and those acts to be implied
therefrom, are all acts requiring pedis possessio, or actual
entry upon and immediate occupation of the land claimed to be
possessed.

Further, those acts enumerated in the statutes are

designed to give the true owner of the property notice that someone else is asserting physical possession of the land.
1(

The requirement for pedis possessio or a foothold upon the
Jf

estate does not change when this court has dealt with possession
of the mineral estate.

This court has held that there is no

actual possession of the severed mineral estate where there
tr

is no actual possession of the beds through mining and extraction.
Kanawha and Hocking Coal and Coke Company v. Carbon County, 535 P.2d
1139, 1140 (Utah 1975).

In that case this Court rigidly applied

the statutes of limitation for tax titles in a mineral dispute
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to bar the plaintiff from challenging defendant Carbon Count
tax title to the coal beds.

The coal beds, which had been

assessed separately from the surface, had been sold to Carbor
County for unpaid taxes for the year 1932.
deed issued to Carbon County in 1937.

The auditor's ta;

Plaintiff occupied anc

possessed the surface, but also asserted ownership of the rob
which had been severed from the surf ace by the tax sale befoi
plaintiff's period of possession commenced.

The Court held'

the plaintiff was barred by §78-12-5.1 from challenging Carb
County's tax title since the county had received its tax deec
more than four years prior to the suit, and since the plainti
had not been in actual possession of the mineral rights conve
to the county by the tax deed within the four year period
prior to the suit.

Interestingly, the issues in Kanawha and

Hocking Coal Company were before the lower court on a motion
for summary judgment.
The instant case does not deal with a severed mineral e:
as did Kanawha.

In this case the undivided one-half mineral

interest has never been severed from the surface estate obtai
by Duchesne County at tax sale.

In other words the entire

~

simple estate in the NW\NE\ remains intact with the title to
the surface and the disputed undivided one-half interest in r
reposing in the same owner, Richard Gerald Dye, under the tai
Miller & Viele admitted in its Answers to Interrogatorie
that it was never in actual occupancy or actual pnssession o!
NW\NE\ which includes the unsevered and undivided one-half m:
interest, and the district court so found.

As operator of tr
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R. G. Dye l-29Al Well, Chevron Oil Company likewise has not been
in actual, physical possession of either the NW\NE\ of Section 29,
or the underlying mineral estate.

The R. G. Dye l-29Al Well was

drilled by and is now operated by Chevron in the SW\NW\SE\ of
Section 29.

The records of the Utah Division of Oil, Gas and Mining

submitted by Miller & Viele clearly reflect that Chevron's drilling
and production activities as operator were confirmed solely to the
well-site.

Chevron has been in actual possession and occupancy

of the lands covered by the lease upon which the well is located,
but has not drilled or produced from a well on the NW\NE\.

Since

the well is not a directional well, slant drilled from the
SW\NW\SE\ into the mineral estate underlying

NW\NE~,

Chevron

has not been in actual physical possession of the mineral estate
underlying the NW\NE\ owned by Dye as holder of the tax title, as
Chevron had no foothold upon the mineral estate.
The question then becomes two-pronged.

First, did Chevron,

as operator of the voluntary pooling unit located on Section 29
to which the Dye lease was commi•ted somehow obtain actual
possession of the undivided mineral interest by production of
oil and gas from a common source of supply by means of a well
located elsewhere in the unit on lands other than those covered
by the Dye lease.

Second, if it is determined that Chevron

was in actual possession of the mineral interest underlying the
NW~NE~,

does that actual possession inure to Miller & Viele.

Miller & Viele states in its brief that other courts ruling
on this issue have held that well drilling operations on pooled
lands are operations for the extraction of minerals from each
of the pooled properties as if by their respective mineral interSponsored by the S.J.
Quinney Law of
Library.Appellant
Funding for digitization provided
by the Institute
of Museum and &
Library
Services
est leaseholders
(Brief
at 15).
Miller
Viele
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

then cites Everts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., Dixon v. American
Liberty Oil Company, and Smith v. Holt, as well as provisions c
the Communitization Agreement and Utah statutes pertaining to
forced and voluntary pooling in an effort to support the propo·
sition.

Unique in this approach is the fact that the Dixon

ca~

is one of the very cases urged by plaintiff below and which
the district court found so convincing in ruling in plaintiffs'
favor.

Through misconstruing the whole thrust and purpose of

those cases, the provisions of the Communitization Agreement ar
the voluntary and forced pooling statute Miller & Viele has
inadvertently marched into plaintiffs' camp waving plaintiffs'
flag.
The persuasive rule in oil and gas producing jurisdictiom
is that removal of oil and gas from under a tract of land by ru
of a well located on adjacent or nearby tracts, even it inclu&
in the same production unit, is insufficient to constitue actui
possession of the mineral estate.

R. Hemingway, The Law of Oii

and Gas 124 (1971) [hereinafter as Hemingway].

Professor Hemin1

stated the foregoing rule under the subparagraph entitled "(Al
of Actual Possession" within a context of his discussion of ad1
possession of minerals.
Meeting this issue head on in the very case Miller & VieL
cites in support of its argument for actual possession, the
Louisiana Supreme Court stated:
[W]here as the drilling ~nd production of oil from
a unitized area constitutes an exercise and user
of mineral rights throughout the entire unit and
operates as a substitute for oerformance of drilling
obligations contained in a mineral lease, these acts
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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are not to be regarded as an eviction of the surface
owner's possession of the minerals or of his exclusive
right thereto when explorations are not conducted on
the land itself.
Dixon v. American Liberty Oil Company,
77 So.2d 533, 538, 4 O&GR 21,23 (1954).
In that case two adjacent tracts were unitized by order of the
Department of Conservation.

A well located on one tract drained

the common pool located under both tracts.

Although this was

' an adverse possession case, it did not turn on the hostile,
exclusive, continuous, or open elements of adverse possession.
r It did turn on the actual possession element.

The court reasoned

that the mineral estate could not be thought of as separate from
the surface estate, since both estates were owned by the same
party and had not been severed.

Consequently, since the minerals

11

were not disturbed in place, that is from actual dominion of the

ie

land itself by oil and gas operations extracting directly from

!i the land,

Ii

Li

11

the operator exercised no physical dominion over the

mineral estate by simply draining the pool.
The reasoning in the Dixon case is consistent with the Utah
theory of ownership of oil and gas in place.

That theory encap-

sulates the notion that oil and gas is a corporeal estate in
ji

real property to be owned as part of the land, similar to ownership of hard minerals.

i, 1019, 1021 (1959).

Chase v. Morgan, 9 Utah 2d 125, 339 P.2d

The Utah rule aligns itself with the majority

position in the country and is juxtaposed to the non-ownership in
place concept which postulates that analogous to wild animals and
water, oil and gas as a fugacious substance cannot be thought of
as being in the possession of a party until reduced to actual
possession at the well-head.

Hemingway at 10.
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In Pan American Petroleum Corporation v. Candelaria,
403 F.2d 351, 355 31 O&GR 215

(10th Cir. 1968), on facts

strikingly similar to those at issue here, the court affirmed
district holding that the unit operator and developer who

cla~

adverse possession of oil and gas underlying lands covered by a
lease committed to a voluntary unit did not effect actual poss€
where the well was not physically located on the lease, althoug
the well might have drained the lands covered by the lease.

In

that case the unit operator, Pan American, was also the lessee

of an unnamed co-defendant who was not in physical possession o
but asserted rights to oil and gas in lands owned by plaintiffs
This case did not turn on the elements of notice
but rather on lack of actual possession.

~r

hostility,

Although the facts an

commentary are scanty in the reported case, they are amply set
forth in photocopies of the Findings of Fact (Nos. 10-19) which
are attached hereto commencing at page 3 of the Appendix.
Finally, the Tenth Circuit in deciding a case which arose
in Utah stated that unitization and pooling agreements were
no more than contracts between lessees with respect to allocation of production and computation of royalties, and did not
vest in the parties to such agreements property rights, possess
or otherwise.
934

Phillips Petroleum Company v. Peterson, 218 F.2d

(10th Cir. 1954).

For a discussion of this principle and

the importance of Phillips Petroleum Company as the leading ca:
see R. Myers, The Law of Pooling and Unitization, Vol. I,
at 439

(1967).

§13.~

The Phillips Petroleum Company case involved

questions arising from unitizing leases on Duchesne County Lan<
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to form the Roosevelt Unit.

Consequently Miller & Viele's

position is not supported by the case law.
Counsel for Miller & Viele also cited Paragraph 8 of the
Cornrnunitization Agreement and Utah Code Ann. §40-6-6 (f) as putting
Chevron in possession of the mineral interest in and underlying
the NW~NE~ by virtue of its operation of the R. G. Dye l-29Al Well.
(Brief of Appellants at 18-20).

Paragraph 8 of the Cornrnunitization

Agreement reads as follows:
8.

The commencement, completion, continued operation
or production of a well or wells for cornrnunitized
substances on the cornrnunitized area shall be construed
and considered as the commencement, completion, continued
operation or production on each and all of the lands
within and comprising said communitized area, and
operations or production pursuant to this agreement
shall be deemed to be operations or production as
to each lease committed hereto.
(emphasis added)
The Cornrnunitization Agreement was executed on October 30, 1973,
by defendant Chevron and plaintiff Gas Producing Enterprises,
Inc., and by Gulf Oil Corporation and Shell Oil Company who are
not parties to this suit.
The pertinent provisions of §40-6-6

(f), read as follows:

(f)
When two or more separately owned tracts
are braced within a drilling unit, or when there are
separately owned interests in all or a part of the
drilling unit, then persons owning such interests
may pool their interests for the development and
operation of the drilling unit.
In the absence of
voluntary pooling, the Commission, upon the application
of any person with an interest in the proposed pooling, may enter an order pooling all interests in the
drilling unit for the development and operation thereof
Operations incident to the drilling of a well upon any
portion of a unit covered by a pooling order shall
be deemed for all purposes to be the conduct.of such
operations upon each separately owned tract in the
unit by the several owners thereof . . . (emphasis added)
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Counsel for Miller & Viele misconstrues Paragraph 8 of ti
Comrnunitiz~tion

Agreement and the statute.

First, those porti

of §40-6-6 (f) urged by counsel and underlined above pertain
cnly to units covered by a compulsory (or forced)
order.

pooling

Such pooling orders are issued by the Corrunission in t}.
In this case, tr.

absence of voluntary pooling by the lessees.

Commission has established 640 acre spacing and drilling units
provided by §40-6-6(a-e),

but has not issued a pooling order,

since all parties voluntarily pooled their leases for producti
by execution of the Corrununitization Agreement.
the sub-section (f)

Consequently,

language urged by Miller & Viele does not

apply to the Section 29 drilling unit.
Second, even if §40-6-6 (f) did apply to the unit, the
language which states that drilling anywhere on the unit "shal
be deemed for all purposes to be" drilling on each lease in tl
unit is language of construction.

The only species of possess

in which sub-section (f) or Paragraph 8 of the Corrununitizatior
Agreement could bestow upon a driller not in actual possessim
is "constructive operation or constructive possession."

How~

the statutes of limitation for tax titles expressly state that
the party challenging a tax title must be in actual possessio1
or actual occupancy.

Constructive operations or constructive

possession was not considered by the legislature as qualifyin
one to challenge a tax title when these limiting statutes wer
enacted.
Third, oil and gas leases on private lands are issued fo
primary terms, generally of ten years and for so long thereaf
as oil and gas is produced from the lease.

Customarily, thes
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1

leases provide for pooling and extension of the leases beyond
the primary terms where production is had in the pooling unit
but not on the lease.

Paragraph 8 of the Communitization

Agreement and sub-section (f) of the pooling statute are responsive
to the contractual language contained in the leases.

The

constructive operations or constructive possession language is
' designed specifically to hold all leases committed to the drilling
unit beyond their primary terms by production from the well drilled
anywhere on the unit.

H. Williams & C. Meyers, VI Oil and Gas

Law, §953 at 708.1-716.l (1977).

[hereinafter cited as Williams

and Meyers] .
In their discussion of the effect of unitization statutes on

~ the extension provisions of oil and gas leases, Professors

:t. Williams and Meyers quote the Mississippi forced pooling statute,

;s

which is similar in language to Utah's §40-6-6 ( f) .

That statute

x reads as follows:

Jr.

at

or.

e

The portion of unit production allocated to a
separately owned tract within the unit area shall be
deemed, for all purposes, to have been actually produced from such tract, and operations with respect to
any tract within the unit area shall be deemed for all
purposes to be the conduct of operations for the production of oil or gas, or both, from each separately
owned tract in the unit area.
Miss Code Ann §6132106 quoted in Williams and Meyers at 708.5-708.6.

ncconstruing the meaning of the foregoing statute and language

re similar to Paragraph 8 of the Communitization Agreement, the
authors conclude:
or

.f

·S'

Everybody agrees that the standard language
appearing in voluntary agreements and in
some statutes - the language of the first
sentence of Section 106 - should be taken
to mean .
. that the lease will be preserved.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Finally, language from the Dixon case quoted by both plaint
and defendants demonstrates the preservation aspect of the const
tive language of such statutes and voluntary agreements.

That

language is again set forth as follows:
[W]here as the drilling and production of oil from a
unitized area constitutes an exercise and user of mineral
rights throughout the entire unit and operates as a
substitute for performance of drilling obligations
contained in a mineral lease, these acts are not to be
regarded as an eviction of the .
. owner's possession
of the mineral or of his exclusive right thereto when
explorations are not conducted on the land itself.
Dixon, 77 So2d at 538, 4 O&GR at 23.
This language tracks the provisions of Paragraph 8 of the
Cornmunitization Agreement and sub-section (f) of the statute.
Although the Louisiana Supreme Court correctly concluded that
drilling on one lease in the voluntary pooling unit was a
substitute for performance of drilling obligations on all other
leases, the court determined that such drilling did not put the
operator into actual possession of those leases not actually dri
upon.

This clearly shows that the type of language contained in

Paragraph 8 of the Cornmunitization Agreement and §40-6-6(f) is
designed as a substitute for performance, and not to create
either actual or constructive possession.
In both the Everts v. Phillips Petroleum Company, and
Smith v. Holt cases cited respectively at pages 15 and 17 of
Miller & Viele's brief, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that
drilling on one lease in the unit constituted drilling on other
lands within the unit.

In Everts, the question was whether or
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not failure to drill an off-set well activated a

1~%

royalty

provision designed to prevent drainage of the leased lands
from oil wells on adjacent lands.
compulsory pooling abrogated the

The court ruled that
1~%

royalty penalty provision

as production and drilling on one lease in the unit was effective
as though the well were actually drilled on the lease itself.
In Smith, plaintiff had taken assignment of an undivided interest
in mineral underlying twenty acres, already subject to an existing
oil and gas lease which covered the twenty acres and the adjacent
twenty.
order.

The forty acres were affected by a forty acre spacing
Plaintiff argued that since the well was not drilled on

his twenty acres that the oil and gas lessee could not claim an
interest in the minerals.

The court held that defendants' lessee

was owner under lease of the oil and gas in all forty acres since
the lease preceded the assignment to plaintiff.

Consequently,

in Everts, possession was not an issue and the operator was not
i construed to have possessory rights in the mineral estate.

In

n Smith neither the facts nor the law apply since both interests

r

in dispute were covered by one lease.
Therefore, the legislative policy of §40-6-6(f), the
intention of the parties in drafting Paragraph 8 into the
Comrnunitization Agreement, and the clear and obvious meaning
ascribed by oil and gas jurisdictions to such language is that
the language provides a substitute for drilling obligation under
the individual leases in a pool and is designed to hold all leases
within the unit beyond their stated primary terms by production
on any one of the pooled leases.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-21-

There are also compelling policy considerations why Chevror.
should not be considered to be in possession of the undivided
one-half mineral interest in the NW\NE\.

First, regardless of

how one categorises the nature of Chevron's possession of the
oil and gas at the well-head, whether actual or constructive,
Chevron Oil Company is in possession of the substances in its
capacity as operator of the unit, not as Miller & Viele's lessee
As operator, Chevron is no more the agent of Miller
it is of Dye and Gas Producing Enterprises, Inc.
agency as operator under the

Communitiza~ion

&

Viele tha:.

Chevron's

Agreement must be

thought of as separate and distinct from its agency as Miller &
Viele's lessee.

Otherwise, possession would inure to Miller &

Viele fortuitously,

simply because Chevron, who just so happenec

to be Miller & Viele's lessee, was elected by the other lessees
to be the unit operator.
Second, the statutes of limitations for tax titles are
statutes of repose.

Speaking to this issue in Peterson, supra,

this Court stated that §78-12-5.1 is
a statute of repose, obviously intended to
lay to rest claims against tax titles which are
asserted more than four years after acquisition
of a tax title under statutory proceedings, and
where the record owner has not had possession.
Peterson v. Callister, 6 Utah 2d at 361, 313 P.2d
at 815.
To say now that Miller & Viele is in possession pursuant to the
statute by the fortuitous fluke of circumstances in which
Chevron as Miller & viele's lessee is also operator of the unit
would be to totally frustrate the purpose of the statutes of re:
Miller

&

Viele would then be afforded the opportunity to challe:
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the validity of the tax title forty six years after creation of
the title, when the facts surrounding the statutory proceeding are
stale and the persons responsible for complying with the statutory
steps are deceased, removed to other jurisdictions, or are dimmed
in their memory of the events.

All the evidentiary specters

which the statutes are designed to dispell will now be mustered
to roll.

Surely, the legislature could not have intended such

dispossessed, delinquent property owners as Miller & Viele to be
in possession under such a fluke of circumstances.
Fourth, it is inconceivable that a sophisticated mortgage
banking company such as Miller & Viele would not have paid property
taxes on the

NW~NE~

from 1928 to 1946 or investigated the reasons

for not having been assessed if they really thought they owned
the property.

There swells in the breast a certain indignation

at the injustice that Miller & Viele might now be allowed to reap
the benefits of the land when it was Dye's predecessors in interest
who paid all property taxes levied and assessed upon the land
since 1927, and who have actually possessed, improved, and
maintained the

NW~NE~

since 1940.

Finally, Chevron participated in neither the motions for
summary judgment, nor the appeal.

Surely a lessee who thought

it held a title defensible in light of the tax sale or who thought

e it was in actual possession of the undivided mineral interest in

the subject lands so as to prevent application of the statutes of
t,limitation would have aggressively asserted its position.

·~
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The present facts present a particularly appropriate case
for application of the statutes of limitations for tax titles.
Nearly forty six years have lapsed since creation of the tax
title by Auditor's Tax Deed to Duchesne County dated May 9, 193:
now held by plaintiff Richard Gerald Dye as to the surf ace and
the undivided mineral interest now in dispute.

Miller & Viele

admits that it was never in actual possession of the

NW~NE~,

which would include the undivided one-half mineral interest.
Moreover, the facts demonstrate and the applicable statutes and
case law support the conclusion that Chevron Oil Company, as
Miller & Viele's lessee, was not in actual possession of the
undivided mineral interest in and underlying the lands.
Further, Miller

&

Viele never paid the general property ta1

levied and assessed against the lands.

Since Duchesne County

received the tax deed more than four years prior to this action,
since Miller & Viele has failed to meet the possession requirernt
of §§78-12-5.1 and .2, Miller

&

Viele's defense to plaintiff DyE

assertion of ownership to any interest stemming from the Audi to:
Tax Deed including the undivided one-half mineral interest is
barred, and the title to the undivided one-half mineral interes'.
in dispute should be quieted in plaintiff Dye and its oil and

~

lessee, Gas Producing Enterprises, Inc.
Plaintiffs remind the court, that as stated in the defini~
section, §78-12-5.3, the validity of the tax title is not an is:
in any determination of whether or not a party is barred by the
of limitation from attacking or challenging a tax title.
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Valid

of the tax title becomes an issue only where the Court determines
that Miller & Viele, by and through its lessee, Chevron Oil Company,
was in actual possession of the disputed undivided one-half
mineral interest in place in the

NW~NE~.

Such is the mandate

of the Utah Legislature as codified in those statutes.
POINT II
UNDER THE 1946 QUITCLAIM DEED ARTHUR L. YOUNG ACQUIRED ONLY THE
INTERESTS, IF ANY, OF MILLER & VIELE. WHERE MILLER & VIELE HAD
NO INTEREST TO CONVEY, THE RESERVATION OF THE UNDIVIDED ONE-HALF
MINERAL INTEREST WAS A NULLITY, AND SOLICITATION, DELIVERY AND
RECORDATION OF THE QUITCLAIM DEED BY ARTHUR L. YOUNG DID NOT
CONSTITUTE ACQUIESCENCE IN THE RESERVATION.
In Point Two of its argwnent, Miller & Viele appears to
assert that in spite of the statutes of limitation for tax titles,
Dye's predecessor, Arthur L. Young, acquiesced in Miller & Viele's
ownership and right to the undivided one-half mineral interest
reserved to Miller & Viele in its quitclaim of the
Arthur L. Young in 1946 (R-233).

NW~NE~

to

At the time the deed was executed,

Arthur L. Young was record owner of the entire fee in the

NW~NE~

under the tax title.
The docwnent in which Miller & Viele purported to reserve
an undivided one-half mineral interest in the
"QUIT-CLAIM DEED (SPECIAL)"

(R-337).

NW~NE~

is denominated

The words of grant read as

follows:
That the said party of the first part [Miller & Viele]
. . . does he=eby Quit-claim unto the said party of the
second part [Arthur L. Young] . . . (emphasis added)
The deed, strangely enough, contains words of warranty.

It is

obvious that a standard form "Warranty Deed (Special)" was used
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from which the words "warranty" were struck from the title of
document and words of grant.

~

The words "Quit-Claim" were inter·

linated in both the title and words of grant, demonstrating tha:
both parties desire that the instrument evidence a quitclaim of
the NWl.;iNEJ..i.
The law of this state is that a quitclaim does not imply
the conveyance of any particular interest in the property, as
the grantee can only acquire the interest, if any, of his grantc
Wallace v. Build Inc., 16 Utah 2d 401, 402 P. 2d 699, 701 (1965).
Miller & Viele's predecessors in interest had been statatorily
disseized by the tax sale, and therefore had no interest to corn
to Arthur L. Young.

Since a reservation retains in the granter

a portion of what is conveyed, Miller

&

Viele retained or reser.

nothing, since it had nothing to grant.

No cotenancy was or cm

have been created.
The quitclaim deed, though solicited by Arthur L. Young,
was obviously requested to clear the paper title on the records
of the Duchesne County Recorder, a customary procedure among lar
and title men.

No more can be read into the solicitation,

and recording of the quitclaim deed than this.

del~

The very fact

that Miller & Viele purported to reserve an interest it did not
own does not demonstrate acquiescense on the part of Young.
Young merely took what curative document Miller & Viele would g:
realizing that the reservation was meaningless since Miller & V:
owned no interest in the

NW~NEJ..i.
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Consequently, there was no acquiescense or agreement between
Miller & Viele and Dye's predecessor in interest which is binding
on Dye.

The district court rejected the argument as having no

merit, and rightly so.
CONCLUSION
Defendant Miller & Viele has failed to show actual possession
of the

NW~NE~

or the underlying undivided one-half mineral interest

within the four year period prior to interposition of its defense
in 1976.

The very best arguments defendant offered are (1) that

it was in constructive possession of the undivided one-half
mineral interest "in place" in the

NW~NE~

under force of the

voluntary Communitization Agreement, or (2) that it actually
possessed the detached oil and gas at the well-head in the

SE~.

Constructive possession does not qualify Miller & Viele for the
actual possession exception of the statutes of limitation to
prevent the barring of Miller & Viele's defense.

Under the

compelling case law, possession of oil and gas at the well-head
which has been drained from adjacent unitized lands is not actual
possession of the oil and gas or mineral interest in the adjacent
lands.

Since Miller & Viele does not qualify for the other limited

exception and since it did not challenge the tax title within four
years of its creation in 1932, Miller & Viele is barred from
asserting its claim to the disputed undivided one-half mineral
interest at this late date.

The decision of the district court
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quieting title to the undivided one-half mineral interest in
plaintiffs Richard Gerald Dye and Gas Producing Enterprises,
his lessee, should be affirmed.
As to the acquiescence argument, the issue was fully brie
and argued in the district court.
argument had no merit.

Miller

&

That court decided that the
Viele has had its day in cour

on this issue, and it lost.
Respectfully submitted this 1st day of March 1978.

PRUITT & GUSHEE

By~~iBL

torneys for Pla.j(ntiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I hand-delivered two true and correct copi
of the foregoing Brief to Macoy A. McMurray and Robert T. Dale
attorneys for defendant at their offices at 800 Beneficial Lif
Tower, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 1st day of March, 1970
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FROM RECORD ON APPEAL IN
PAN AMERICAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION VS. CANDELARIA

102-105

Filed October 28, 1966
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Court
' The Court makes and adopts the following findings of
fact and conclusions of law:
Findings of Fact
1. The Court has jurisdiction of the parties hereto
and the subject matter hereof.
2. The following described land, the subject of this
action, is situated in the County of Rio Arriba, State of New
Mexico, to wit:
All of the following described tract of land lying
east of the San Juan River in Rio Arriba County, New Mexico,
said part containing 116.28 acres, more or less.
Township 30 North, Range 7 West, NMPM, Rio Arriba
County, New Mexico described as:
The S/2 SE/4, NW/4 SE/4 of Section 18 and the NE/4
NE/4 of Section 19 according to plat of survey filed with the
Surveyor General's Office, Santa Fe, New Mexico, on November
4, 1882;
and described as Tract 45 in Sections 17, 18, 19 and
20 according to plat of independent resurvey filed with the
Surveyor General's Office, Santa Fe, New Mexico, on July 19,
1915.
105
3. Th€ lands were originally patented by the United
States of America to Juan B. Velasquez on March 3, 1909.
59
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Subsequent to the issuance of the Patent, the said Juan B.
i
Velasquez joined by his wife, Maria Albina Lucero deVelasquez,.
conveyed the lands to Bidal A. Candelaria by Warranty Deed
dated January 3, 1914. This deed recites the lands to be by .
the San Juan River in San Juan County and was filed for recorc,
in San Juan County on Jam1ary 12, 1914. Neither the Patent ·
nor Warranty Deed were filed for record in Rio Arriba County
until the year 1962.
4. Bidal A. Candelaria acquired title to the above
described lands on January 3, 1914, and retained title to
these lands until his death.

5. Bidal A. Candelaria died on April 24, 1926, at
Carbon Junction, Colorado, and at the ti.me of his death, he
resided in Ignacio, Colorado.
6. The District Court of Rio Arriba County, New
Mexico has entered an Order determining the heirship of Bidal
A. Candelaria, deceased, in Cause No. 295, from which it
appears that the estate of Bidal A. Candelaria, deceased, is
now owned as follows:
Name
Manuelita Candelaria
Delubina Candelaria Salazar
Marie Candelaria Moreno
Bennie Candelaria Martinez
Genevieve Candelaria
Juanita Candelaria Mowbray
Aurora Candelaria Marquez
Mary Q. Candelaria
Frank Candelaria
Anna Marie Candelaria, also known as
Sister Mary Corona
Augustina Candelaria Baumer
Marie Elena Candelaria Byron
Dolores Candelaria Romero

Interest
12 .5%
12 .5'7.
12 .57.
12.5%
12.5%
12 .s1.
12.5%
3.1257.
1.8757.

1.8751'.
1 .87 SI.
1.8751'.
1.8751'.

106
Dolores Candelaria Romero is a minor at this time but proper~
represented herein by her mother and guardian, Mary O. Canciel·
aria.
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7. All of the lands were rendered for taxes in San
iuan County for the years 1913, 1914 and 1919 through 1939.
~,·axes were assessed against B. A. Candelaria in San Juan County
'or the year 1913, sold by Tax Sale Certificate No. 426 and
·edeemed by B. A. Candelaria on January 2, 1915. By Tax Deed
rc:ated I-larch 30, 1937, the lands were conveyed by the San Juan
:aunty Treasurer to the State of New Mexico, and on December
.4, 1944, the lands were thereafter conveyed by the New Mexico
:rate Tax Commission to Saul A. Yager. These two deeds recite
.he lands to be in San Juan County and were timely filed for
·ecoid in San Juan County. Saul A. Yager rendered the lands
~r taxes, and paid taxes, in San Juan County for the years
.945 through 1959, at which time the surface was condemned by
he Federal Government. After 1959, no taxes were assessed by
:an Juan County. No part of the lands were rendered for taxes
.n Rio Arriba County until the year 1962.

8. In 1947 Saul A. Yager filed a quiet title suit in
he District Court of San Juan County in Cause No. 02439
1 escribing the lands involved herein as being located in San
~an County.
B. A. Candelaria had been deceased since 1926
nd was named as a living person in said quiet title suit.
he record in Cause No. 02439 shows that Bidal A. Candelaria
as not personally served with process, and none of the plainiffs in this action was personally served with process.
otice of lis pendens in said Cause No. 02439 was not filed in
.io Arriba County.
107
9. In 1948 Saul A. Yager exeucted two oil and gas
eases to Wayne Moore purporting to lease the minerals underying the lands involved herein and describing the lands as
eing located in San Juan County. The defendants are succesors in interest to Wayne l-!oore.
10. The defendants included the lands involved herein
n the Unit Agree~ent and Unit Operating Agreement for the
evelopment and operation of the Northeast Blanco Unit Area.
11. In 1953 Blackwood & Nichols Company, operator of
he ~ortheast Blanco Unit, obtained a compulsory pooling order
lyrom the New ~!exico Oil Conservation Corrmission pooling the
l·
61
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properties in the E/2 of Section 18, E/2 of Section 19, W/2 t
Section 17 and W/2 of Section 20 into four separate drilli~f
and proration units.
'd
t

ants

12. Wells were ccmmenced and completed by the defert
on the dates and for the costs hereinafter set forth: e
r

Dates of Well Commencement and Completion

Well

12-18

8/29/53 - 10/16/53

13-20

8/31/53 - 12/17/53

35-19

7/14/57-

24-17

5/1/55 - 5/22/55

7/25/57

Cost
d

$90, 681. 35 (Mesa Ver
Formation)
$114,785.86 (Dakotai.J
Formation)
t:
$16 5 , 5 6 9 . 2 0 (Me s a V1 1,
Formation)
Ci
$87, 865. 7 5 (Mesa Ve:~~
Formation)
$64,502 .00 (Mesa Ve:ir
Form2tion)
ME

Sl

The Dakota Formation in the 12-18 Well was dry.

13. Acreage was dedicated to the wells by the def~
ants for the purpose of receiving an allowable as hereinaf:tr
set forth:

ef

ir

108

at

Well

Acreage Dedicated

12-18
13-20
35-19
24-17

E/2
W/2
E/2
S/2

Section
Sect ion
Section
Section

18
20
19
17

be

th

. HI

:ti

?l

je

14. A portion of the lands involved herein •..;as decn
cated to each of the four wells and the total acreage dedic:lp
ed to the four wells included all of the lands involved he~
None of the wells were physically located on the land invol
in this action.
15.

The defendants have rece:'..ved an allowable fror:
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the ~lew Mexico Oil Conservation Commission for each of the
four wells based upon the acreage dedicated to each well. The
defendants' allowable has been proportionately increased by
their dedication to each well of the plaintiffs' acreage. If
.they had not been able todedicate the plaintiffs' acreage to
each well their allowable would have been proportionately
reduced.

16. The four wells drilled by the defendants have
drained gas and other minerals from the lands involved herein.

17. The plaintiffs were not aware of the wells here
involved, or that they owned the lands involved or of any of
the proceedings relative to the quiet title suit, oil and gas
1.leases, unitization or actions before the New Mexico Oil
'conservation Commission. The plaintiffs did not discover
,,that they could assert any of the claims asserted herein until
·'they were joined as parties defendant in Civil Action No. 3934
in the United States District Court for the District of New
1
~ Mexico by the United States Government for condemnation of the
surface of the lands involved herein.
109
er

18. The defendants acted in good faith in drilling
the wells in question and in their unitization efforts and
efforts before the Oil Conservation Commission. Their action
in using the plaintiffs' lands to obtain an increased allowable and increased production was in good faith and in the
belief that they had the right to do so.

1,

19. The defendants hive been unjustly enriched and
the plaintiffs have been damaged by the defendants in the
·1mount of the full value of all production attributable to
:he lands involved herein, based upon the percentage of the
?laintiffs' acreage dedicated to each of the four well's · The
.Jefendants are entitled to deductions for the plaintiffs'
~ noportionate share of expenditures made in development and
lC'iperation of the wells.
er·
Jl
Conclusions of Law
1.

The Court has jurisdiction over the parties and
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the subject matter of this cause.
2. The plaintiffs are the owners of the minerals
underlying the lands involved herein and are entitled to a
decree quieting their title against the adverse claims of
the defendants.
3. The defendants have been unjustly enriched to
detriment of the plaintiffs. The defendants should, then
account to the plaintiffs for the plaintiffs' share of all
production from the four wells to be determined by the a~
of plaintiffs' acreage dedicated to each well, plus intere.
on said production from the date of production at the rate
6 percent per annum.
In accounting to the plaintiffs the
defendants should be allowed to deduct from the
110
amount due the plaintiffs the plaintiffs' share of the co:
development and operating costs to be determined by the u
of plaintiffs' acreage dedicated to each well, plus inten
on said sums from the date of expenditure at the rate of!
percent per annum, but should not be allowed to deduct the
cost of drilling the 12-18 well to the Dakota formation.
4. The defendants have converted the plaintiffs'
minerals to the defendants' use.
5. The plaintiff's right to recovery in this act.
is not barred by the doctrine of laches, the applicable~
Mexico statute of limitations, or the doctrine of res
judicata.
6. The quiet title decree on which the defendant
rely is void as to these lands and as against these defe~
ants.
7. The plaintiffs should have judgment against
defendants for the costs of this action.
All Requested Findings and Conclusions not
ated in the above are refused.
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Dated at Albuquerque, New Mexico, on this the 28th day
of October, 1966.
Howard Bratton
United States District Judge
Filed October 28, 1966
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